The German strategies of World War II were almost exclusively designed or condoned by Adolf Hitler himself. The initial successes of his unconventional and aggressive strategies, both military and political (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Poland, France), combined with the mythical attributes ascribed to him ("Führerprinzip"), led to wide support for his leadership, both among the German population and the traditional military.
The main point of Hitler's strategy was the accumulation of Lebensraum ("Living space") for the Germanic (or so-called Aryan) race. Citing the Treaty of Versailles suffocating indemnities and exploiting the public anxieties of the 1930s economic hardships, he asserted that the German borders were too contained to secure their appropriate position in the geo-political world relations, and that he needed territories similar to the (British and French) colonies to secure enough economic resources to assure Germany's position as a major power. Furthermore, the current population of these territories justifiably ought to be enslaved, migrated, or exterminated, and re-populated by Germanic settlers. He felt that these areas could best be secured in the East (Poland, Ukraine, Russia) because he thought the races populating these territories were inferior. Abroad, he made deceptive promises to potential spoilers (Chamberlain, U.K.) and made treaties with fascist and imperial cohort nations (Italy, Spain, Japan.)
The intended strategy to achieve these goals was a series of relatively short wars, employingblitzkrieg (lightning attack) tactics, to defeat one opponent at a time, and thus securing more land step by step. These wars were to be intertwined with periods of peace, or stalemate, when the German army could re-supply and accumulate force for the next war. The initial success of this strategy (the re-militarization of the Saarland, the Austrian Anschluss (annexation), and the occupation in two stages of Czechoslovakia) stifled opposition and gave Hitler great prestige. Hitler didn't realize that the turning point had come with the invasion of Poland. Both France and Britain had frowned upon his expansion, and declared war on Germany on that occasion. Hitler believed that Britain could be put out of the war by the defeat of France, but he had underestimated the British determination. Even though Britain couldn't do much against Germany at first, a war of attrition had begun - something that the "blitzkrieg" concept was never designed for.
In the later years of the war, Hitler's strategy became more and more based on paranoia, intuition, flawed logic, and unrealistic assumptions. However, the strength of his terrible hold on domestic policy remained so strong, that his authority was not questioned, any challenge was quickly suppressed. Later, he ordered continued bombing of Britain and the uneconomical prosecution of the eastern front efforts despite the strategic costs and failures. In the final stages of the war, his actions and orders had turned into the rambling of a madman rather than any attempt to conduct a coherent strategy.
The main point of Hitler's strategy was the accumulation of Lebensraum ("Living space") for the Germanic (or so-called Aryan) race. Citing the Treaty of Versailles suffocating indemnities and exploiting the public anxieties of the 1930s economic hardships, he asserted that the German borders were too contained to secure their appropriate position in the geo-political world relations, and that he needed territories similar to the (British and French) colonies to secure enough economic resources to assure Germany's position as a major power. Furthermore, the current population of these territories justifiably ought to be enslaved, migrated, or exterminated, and re-populated by Germanic settlers. He felt that these areas could best be secured in the East (Poland, Ukraine, Russia) because he thought the races populating these territories were inferior. Abroad, he made deceptive promises to potential spoilers (Chamberlain, U.K.) and made treaties with fascist and imperial cohort nations (Italy, Spain, Japan.)
The intended strategy to achieve these goals was a series of relatively short wars, employingblitzkrieg (lightning attack) tactics, to defeat one opponent at a time, and thus securing more land step by step. These wars were to be intertwined with periods of peace, or stalemate, when the German army could re-supply and accumulate force for the next war. The initial success of this strategy (the re-militarization of the Saarland, the Austrian Anschluss (annexation), and the occupation in two stages of Czechoslovakia) stifled opposition and gave Hitler great prestige. Hitler didn't realize that the turning point had come with the invasion of Poland. Both France and Britain had frowned upon his expansion, and declared war on Germany on that occasion. Hitler believed that Britain could be put out of the war by the defeat of France, but he had underestimated the British determination. Even though Britain couldn't do much against Germany at first, a war of attrition had begun - something that the "blitzkrieg" concept was never designed for.
In the later years of the war, Hitler's strategy became more and more based on paranoia, intuition, flawed logic, and unrealistic assumptions. However, the strength of his terrible hold on domestic policy remained so strong, that his authority was not questioned, any challenge was quickly suppressed. Later, he ordered continued bombing of Britain and the uneconomical prosecution of the eastern front efforts despite the strategic costs and failures. In the final stages of the war, his actions and orders had turned into the rambling of a madman rather than any attempt to conduct a coherent strategy.